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REMARKS ON THE COGNITIVE BASE OF
PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLES*
andrás kertész – csilla rákosi
The present paper aims at the exemplification of the applicability of plausibility anal-
ysis to linguistics. Starting from the criticism of Robinson (1997), the paper argues for
two assumptions. Firstly, as opposed to a theory of distributed systems, it is a theory
of plausible reasoning that is capable of capturing basic methodological problems of
theory formation in pragmatics (such as circularity, category error, the arbitrariness
of interpretations of data and the objectification of the theorist’s cultural and linguis-
tic knowledge as principles of language behaviour). Secondly, the cognitive base of
pragmatic principles is inferential and plausibilistic, rather than non-inferential and
probabilistic.
1. Introduction
1.1. On objective theories of language and cognition
In a provocative paper Edward A. Robinson (1997) claims that pragmatic
theories motivated by Grice (1975) or Sperber and Wilson’s relevance
theory (1986/1995) are paradigm examples of what he calls “objective
theories of language and cognition”. This kind of objectivism has, in
Robinson’s view, at least two central features (see Robinson 1997, 256):
(a) Researchers presuppose the distinction between subject and ob-
ject which is characteristic of the relationship between a scientist and the
things he or she observes. This means that scientists assume to observe
impartially external objects. As a result, it is taken for granted that the
rules and structures described are impartial facts which are true or false.
(b) Objective theories of language and cognition tend to turn the
structures which have been created in this way into structures of the
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mind. They assume the existence of a kind of cognitive content which
causes people to act and which can be described independently of the
background knowledge of the scientists who observe linguistic behaviour.
Objective theories in this sense raise a series of fundamental difficul-
ties that can be summarized as follows (see Robinson 1997, 256–8).
The first is that objective theories yield a category error according to
which the mechanisms underlying the linguistic behaviour described are
identified with the models of language one obtains as a result of trying to
objectively describe the things observed. That is, the theoretical model is
assumed to be identical with the cognitive content underlying linguistic
behaviour which this model is intended to describe. In this way objective
theories are assumed to translate immediately into mental structures.
Secondly, from (a) and (b) above it follows that objective theories of
cognition are in fact nothing but the interpretations of the scientist.
Thirdly, a certain kind of circularity presents itself. On the one
hand, the theorist maintains that there exist certain principles which
govern communicative behaviour. On the other hand, theorists use their
cultural and linguistic knowledge in order to define basic terms with the
help of which communicative behaviour is described. Accordingly, what
the theorist describes is in fact the reflection of his/her own commu-
nicative and cultural knowledge.1 By way of illustration, let us mention
the example of the Gricean maxims. At first sight it seems to be the
case that these maxims objectively describe certain mechanisms which
seem to underlie everyday communication and which may also account
for certain kinds of meanings that are brought about by certain utter-
ances. Nevertheless, these maxims can be formulated only because the
researcher himself/herself has an understanding of what in a given soci-
ety counts as brief, relevant, orderly, informative. Thus, what happens is
that the researcher’s own cultural knowledge is objectified: those pieces
of information which are properties of the theory are assumed to con-
stitute objective accounts of what actually happens in communicative
processes. Such knowledge is considered to be the cognitive base of prag-
matic principles, while in fact it is nothing but cultural knowledge that
all members of a given society, including the researcher himself/herself,
share. The researcher does not detect regularities objectively given, but
rather, he/she projects his/her own knowledge onto the object of his/her
1 Independently of Robinson’s argumentation, Kertész (2004a) discusses a similar
kind of circularity with respect to cognitive semantic theories such as Lakoff and
Johnson’s embodied realism and Bierwisch and Lang’s two-level model.
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investigations while claiming the latter to be objectively detected.2 This
inevitably leads to a difficulty which concerns the infinity of the relations
included in the base:
“Of course, it can be argued that this simply means we need to objectively
define all of the relationships within the cultural knowledge base and to allow
the principles to act on these defined relationships. [. . .] In an objective
theory, all of the conceptual base that can make a difference in interpretation
must be explicitly defined. But, if we consider this, we find that the number
of relations that need to be explicated is theoretically infinite. For instance,
consider (3):
(3) A: How are we getting to the movie?
B: Well, I have the car.
For B’s response to mean ‘I’ll drive’, B must have a licence, the car must
have fuel, it must seat more than one passenger, the battery must have acid,
all the essential working parts must be present and correctly assembled, the
laws of physics must be in effect, etc., ad infinitum. Any of these facts
of cultural knowledge can be challenged to cancel the implicature in B’s
response that they can use the car. [. . .] Because all of these assumptions can
figure in the final implicature, an objective system must specify all of these
assumptions in all of the different situations in order to determine which
are in effect for a given utterance. Once we have taken for granted the
epistemological assumption inherent in objective approaches to language and
cognition, we must fully formalize the knowledge base. Of course, to define all
these possible inferences, there must be a fully spelled-out knowledge base.
The complexity of this knowledge base has been a central concern for
many theorists in the behavioural and cognitive sciences. [. . .] Ultimately,
the task proved to be impossible—objectively defining the full cultural base
of understanding is an infinite process of specifying and respecifying finer
and finer grains of detail. [. . .] It is beyond the ability of a formal system
to capture cultural knowledge, i.e., the knowledge used in discourse under-
standing.” (Robinson 1997, 258–9; emphasis added)
The difficulties thus summarized boil down to two distinct but inter-
related problems. The first is a metascientific problem concerning the
methodology which pragmatic theories make use of, whereas the second
is an object-scientific one which focuses on a specific aspect of the object
of pragmatic theories, namely, the cognitive base of pragmatic principles:
2 Cf. the following quotation: “As a cognitive mechanism, these principles are
defined as decision metrics. What a brief or orderly usage is, is what the principle
is supposed to tell us. But, to make a decision, these principles must have a
definition of the value they are determining. Unfortunately, this definition is a
reflection of the structure of the theorist’s knowledge.” (Robinson 1997, 258;
emphasis added)
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(P1) The methodological problem of pragmatic theories: How can a pragmatic theory
avoid
(a) the category error previously referred to,
(b) the potential arbitrariness of interpretations,
(c) circularity, and
(d) that the theorist’s cultural and linguistic knowledge be objectified as princi-
ples of language behaviour?
(P2) The problem of the cognitive base of pragmatic theories: How can the cognitive
base underlying pragmatic principles be accounted for, if we know that it
(a) contains an infinite amount of assumptions,
(b) consists of assumptions which are context-dependent, and
(c) cannot be captured by objective theories because the latter should account
for an infinite process of specifying and respecifying the information it con-
sists of?
1.2. Solutions to (P1) and (P2)
Robinson’s solution to (P1) is this:
(S1) A theory of distributed systems avoids (P1)(a)–(d).
In accordance with (S1), he also puts forward a possible solution to (P2):
“The regularities which the theories above describe emerge from the action of
a distributed system as it exists in the world. They are not represented in the
cognitive system but reflect its general existential nature. They represent an
external observer’s view of the overall activity of a number of independent
but mutually sensitive interacting cognitive and situational factors, none of
which independently represents any specific pragmatic principle. [. . .] Rather
than viewing concepts as discrete representations, we should view them as
relative and subjective entities. In such a view, internal representations are
dynamic, generalized associations which always act relative to the environ-
ment. [. . .] I will relate objective linguistic theories to a more realistic view
of cognition which does not depend on individual mental representations and
calculations. [. . .] This approach, while it remains objective as an external
description of behaviour, has the advantage of not utilizing locally defin-
able representations. Instead, it treats the speaker as an integral part of the
environment by modelling the environment and the associational patterns
and mechanisms that tie the individual to the environment. We must not
treat mental representations as descriptions but as probabilistic traces tied
to the environment. Understanding is not the calculation and representation
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of a knowledge structure in the mind. It is rather the state of the cogni-
tive system at a certain point in time in relation to the world around it.”
(Robinson 1997, 259f; emphasis added)
The main aspects of this proposal can be summarized as in (S2):
(S2) The sub-problems of (P2) can be solved by assuming that the cognitive base of
pragmatic principles includes relations which are
(a) non-inferential, and
(b) probabilistic.
1.3. Remarks on (S1) and (S2)
There are a couple of important issues which seem to question the work-
ability of Robinson’s model. Let us in what follows point out some of
them.
The model proposed by Robinson cannot avoid the problems listed
in (P1) as he himself observes.3 Nevertheless he maintains that “whereas
the pragmatic theories [. . .] point towards regularities at their level of
description, this model can be used to point to regularities at another,
perhaps neural or ecological, level of description” (Robinson 1997, 264).
Thus, Robinson simply pushes the problem to another level of the-
oretical description, i.e., to another subsystem of “a distributed system”
(e.g., perceptual system, associative memory). However, we cannot carry
on the generation of new levels endlessly; in order to prevent ourselves
from getting into an infinite regress we have to stop somewhere. But
at the last level we are forced to turn the structures of the theoretical
description into structures of the mind.
Moreover, if we ask the question of how he knows which conceptual
content is associated with a certain utterance, we cannot avoid answering:
on the basis of his cultural and linguistic knowledge. So, the same kind
of circularity seems to appear in this model as that which it was intended
to resolve. This can be illustrated by the following quotation:4
3 “Of course, we can formulate objections against this model similar to those made
earlier against the linguistic descriptive models.” (Robinson 1997, 264)
4 The quotation refers to the following example:
“(2) A: Did you go to Bloomingdale’s when you went to New York?
B: Well, what do you think of my new dress?” (Robinson 1997, 257)
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“For example, in (2) the conversants are discussing whether B had gone to
Bloomingdale’s. Thus, knowledge associated with Bloomingdale’s is active
for both conversants. Part of this knowledge is the fact that Bloomingdale’s
sells dresses. This is simply part of the cultural knowledge that A and B
possess about Bloomingdale’s. These two individuals, having been raised in
their particular culture, have learned what Bloomingdale’s is, and part of
this knowledge is that it sells dresses. While this association may not be the
most active thing for A at the time of his or her utterance, this relationship is
further activated by B’s response. Furthermore, A’s goal is to get an answer
to the first question, and A and B are following standard conversational
patterns. So the implicature is automatically available to A because of the
correspondence between A’s goals and salient aspects of the conceptual ma-
terial associated with dresses and Bloomingdale’s. Within this approach, it
is not calculated; it arises from the correspondence of all of these parts as
they are activated within this context.” (op.cit., 267f; emphasis added)
Now we may ask what the source of the knowledge of the associations
is that are most probable in this situation: surely, it is Robinson’s own
cultural knowledge. He does not mention any experiments in which the
perceptual system and the memory of the people in this dialogue have
been investigated with the methods of neuropsychology. Therefore, (S1)
is not capable of capturing this kind of problem (see also section 1.1).
At least one of the sources of the difficulties might be that the gap
between the level of the associative memory and that of linguistic be-
haviour is too great. For instance, the principle that “[. . .] if we look at
how the cognitive system [. . .] works, we see that relevance is actually
created by this system, because it is organized to associate things re-
lated in previous experience” (ibid., 267), significantly underdetermines
linguistic meaning.
In direct connection with this finding, (S2)(a) appears to be prob-
lematic as well. Suppose that there is a third person C who has never
heard the name Bloomingdale’s. Despite this fact, he or she may find out
the implicated content of B’s answer—without having any knowledge as-
sociated with the name of the department store mentioned. In this case,
we cannot claim that the implicature is automatically available to him or
her. On the contrary: C can only ‘calculate’ the intended meaning of B’s
utterance by drawing inferences from the content of the question, the an-
swer and some additional background knowledge about buying dresses. A
similar case can be constructed through the modification of the dialogue:
(1) A: Your dress is really nice.
B: I was at Bloomingdale’s when I went to New York.
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Here A need not have any knowledge of Bloomingdale’s to be able to
understand the whole content of B’s response. He or she can only infer
it from pieces of information rooted in his or her cultural knowledge.
Consequently, (S2)(a) may be questioned.
A third example is worth mentioning:
(2) A: Mrs. X is an old bag.
B: The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn’t it?5
If we consider the principle formulated by Robinson that “[. . .] only what
is specifically uttered is what is fully activated” (ibid., 265f), then we can-
not find out what B intended to communicate. Certainly, A’s statement
is part of the context, so we have to take it into consideration as well.
But B’s utterance has seemingly nothing to do with A’s words: it seems
to be totally irrelevant in comparison to the content of A’s statement.
Realizing this, we remember previous experiences of similar situations
and conclude that B wanted to say that A had been impolite and he
or she refused to talk in this way. But this means that A can be in
possession of the entire situation only after discovering that B’s contri-
bution has been irrelevant. Consequently, the link between associations
and implicatures seems to be not as directly probabilistic as supposed by
Robinson—therefore, (S2)(b) is problematic, too. Rather, it seems to be
the case that we are dealing with a ‘cyclic’ and ‘prismatic’ revaluation of
the pieces of information available.
The point, then, is that the claim that “the activation of the goal and
of the perceived circumstances at the same time results in a correspon-
dence between all of the parts which arises as an automatic, reflexive
mental process [. . .]” (Robinson 1997, 268) might be replaced by the
following assumption: The activation of the goal and of the perceived
circumstances at the same time results in a correspondence between all
of the parts which arises as a cyclic and prismatic inference and decision
process.
In sum, the above considerations indicate that both (S1) and (S2)
may be problematic and these problems justify the search for alternative
suggestions.
5 See Grice (1975, 54).
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1.4. Alternatives to (S1) and (S2)
At this point of our argumentation we hypothetically put forward the
following alternatives to (S1) and (S2):
(S1′) A theory of plausible reasoning avoids (P1)(a)–(d).
(S2′) (P2) can be solved by assuming that the cognitive base of pragmatic principles
includes relations which are
(a) inferential in a specific sense, and
(b) cyclic and prismatic.
As the above summary witnesses, at first sight Robinson’s views seem to
be quite odd, and therefore, one may ask the question if the problems
(P1) and (P2) are ‘real’ problems, or rather, just arbitrarily constructed
quandaries. Nevertheless, we will try to show that this is not so and that
it is precisely the unusual nature of Robinson’s line of argumentation that
makes it an instructive starting point for illustrating the workability of
our approach to the methodology of pragmatics both on an object- and
metascientific level. We hope that in arguing for an alternative solution
to (P1) and (P2) we will be able to sketch the basic tenets of a theory of
plausible reasoning which will prove to be a fruitful tool for solving central
problems of theory formation in pragmatics in particular and linguistics
in general.
In the rest of this paper we will proceed as follows. In section 2 we
will briefly outline some tenets of a theory of plausible reasoning on a high
level of abstraction (section 2.1); nevertheless, we will also show that it
is not unreasonable to assume the cognitive reality of plausible inferences
(section 2.2). In section 3 we will try to show that (S2′) is a possible
alternative to (S2) which is capable of capturing (P2) by accounting for
some of the shortcomings of (S2). In section 4 we will briefly touch on
(P1) indicating that the theory of plausible reasoning we have introduced
can maintain (S1′). Finally, section 5 will summarize the main findings
and raise open questions that seem to be worth considering in the future.
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2. On plausible inferences
2.1. Basic assumptions
In this section we will summarize certain aspects of a possible theory of
plausible reasoning. The scope of the present paper does not allow us to
provide a precise explication of the basic notions, therefore we will con-
sciously use them preexplicatively. Nevertheless, we make the following
terminological remarks, which are not intended to be precise explications
but which serve to render our line of argumentation followable and un-
derstandable.
First, the notions of ‘deductive’, ‘conclusive’, ‘demonstrative’ and
‘logical’ inference are used as synonyms, and so are the notions of ‘plau-
sible’, ’non-demonstrative’ and ‘non-conclusive’ inference.6 Second, we
regard the basic concepts and the notational conventions of propositional
logic as given, and they are not introduced systematically. Third, the no-
tions of ‘consistency’ and ‘non-contradiction’ and those of ‘inconsistency’
and ‘contradiction’ are also treated as synonyms, respectively. Fourth,
by ‘heuristics’ we understand rules (i) the role of which is to survey (in a
non-systematic manner) relatively large domains of problems, (ii) which
may lead to the solution of a certain problem, but (iii) which do not nec-
essarily lead to the solution or to the optimal solution of this problem.
Fifth, by ‘data’ we understand such assertions that embody the knowl-
edge available to us for the solution of a problem in a given informational
state (according to this formulation, we call not only those assertions
‘data’ which describe ‘facts’ or ‘observations’ in whatever sense of these
terms, but also every such background assumption which we use during
the argumentation).7
6 Nevertheless, see Kertész – Rákosi (2005b) for a more sophisticated treatment
of these notions according to which non-demonstrative/non-conclusive inferences
include both plausible and fallacious inferences.
7 On this interpretation of ‘data’ cf. Rescher and Brandom’s characterization:
“ ‘Data’: theses that can serve as acceptance-candidates in the context of in-
quiry, contentions which, at best, are merely presumptively true [. . . ]. These are
not certified truths (or even probable truths) but theses that are in a position
to make some claims upon us for acceptance: They are prima facie truths in the
sense that we would incline to grant them acceptance-as-true if (and this is a very
big IF) there were no countervailing considerations upon the scene.” (Rescher –
Brandom 1979, 69)
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Presupposing these terminological remarks, in what follows we char-
acterize plausible inferences by taking the classical work of George Polya
and Nicholas Rescher as our starting point.8 We will integrate findings
which have already been put forward in the literature and as a result
of this integration of classical approaches we will sketch a coherent and
many-sided account of plausible reasoning.9
(i) The notion of plausible inference. The common features of plau-
sible inferences can be summed up in two points as a first approximation:
“First, they do not have the certainty of a strict demonstration. Second, they
are useful in acquiring essentially new knowledge, and even indispensable to
any not purely mathematical or logical knowledge, to any knowledge con-
cerned with the physical world. We could call the reasoning that underlies
this kind of evidence ‘heuristic reasoning’ or ‘inductive reasoning’ or (if we
wish to avoid stretching the meaning of existing terms) ‘plausible reason-
ing’.” (Polya 1948, 221f; emphasis added)
The fundamental difference between plausible and deductive inferences
can be demonstrated through the following example:
Deductive inference: Plausible inference:
If A, then B It is certain that if A then B
not B A is possible, B is not certain
not A After verifying B, A is more plausible
modus tollens reduction
8 It is important to emphasize that Polya’s and Rescher’s views are fully com-
patible: “Polya’s entire analysis of the logic of inductive reasoning can also be
accommodated on the present approach” (Rescher 1976, 67). Moreover, there are
at least two substantial reasons for concentrating on these classical approaches.
Firstly, due to the pioneering nature of these works, there is no avoiding their use
in presenting the essentials of plausible reasoning (see Woods et al. 2000, 258).
Secondly, Polya’s and Rescher’s ideas are not outmoded at all, because they have
been rediscovered and integrated into current trends which revaluate traditional
problems of the philosophy of science such as the distinction between the context
of justification and the context of discovery, inconsistency, the process of scientific
problem solving, etc.; in this way these ideas have been integrated into current
approaches to argumentation theory and AI research. Therefore, it is unavoidable
to take those classical works by Polya and Rescher as our starting point which
most current accounts of plausible reasoning are rooted in. Should our approach
turn out to be tenable, later refinements in the light of recent advances will be
both possible and necessary.
9 For a considerably more comprehensive discussion of our approach see Kertész
(2004b); Kertész – Rákosi (2005a) and Rákosi (2005).
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(ii) The uncertainty of plausible inferences. The definitive differ-
ence between the two conclusions in the example above is that while
with deductive inferences the truth of the conclusion follows from the
truth of the premises with certainty, in the case of plausible inferences
the premises merely increase the credibility of the conclusion (cf. Polya
1954, 113). Consequently, plausible inferences are less reliable by na-
ture than conclusive inferences: they necessarily involve the possibility
of mistakes, errors and rejectability (see also Walton 2001, 159).
(iii) The heuristic function of plausible inferences. We very often
find ourselves in a situation during the solving of a problem that, at a
certain point, we have several hypotheses (conjectures) at our disposal
which mutually exclude each other, but every one of which is supported
by certain considerations and therefore each may represent a possible
alternative in view of the amount of information which we possess. Then
we have to decide between competing hypotheses but we cannot turn
to deductive logic for help. Thus, plausible inferences are heuristic tools
with the purpose of bringing us closer to the solution of a certain problem,
inasmuch as they help us form an opinion of which possible alternative
is the most promising on the basis of the information available to us at
any given moment (Polya 1948, 102; cf. also the quotation in (i); Walton
2001, 164).
(iv) The partial basis of plausible inferences. With deductive infer-
ences, the premises make up a ‘full basis’ in the sense that “[i]f we receive
some new information that does not change our belief in the premises,
it cannot change our belief in the conclusion” (Polya 1948, 223). On
the other hand, in the case of plausible inferences the premises make up
only a ‘partial basis’, that is the complete basis has a part which is not
expressed through the premises:
“[. . .] the premises constitute only one part of the basis on which the con-
clusion rests, the fully expressed, the ‘visible’ part of the basis; there is an
unexpressed, invisible part, formed by something else, by inarticulate feel-
ings perhaps, or by unstated reasons. In fact, it can happen that we receive
some new information that leaves our belief in both premises completely
intact, but influences the trust we put in A in a way just opposite to that
expressed in the conclusion. To find A more plausible on the ground of
the premises of our heuristic syllogism is only reasonable. Yet tomorrow I
may find grounds, not interfering at all with these premises, that make A
appear less plausible, or even definitively refute it. The conclusion may be
shaken and even overturned completely by commotions in the invisible parts
of its foundation, although the premises, the visible part, stand quite firm.”
(Polya 1948, 223f; emphasis added)
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(v) The context-dependence of plausible inferences. In plausible in-
ferences the conclusion cannot be detached from the premises. Moreover,
Polya emphasizes that the ‘weight’ of the conclusion depends not only
on the premises explicitly formulated, but also on hidden grounds which
form the ‘invisible’ part of the partial basis such as the individual’s back-
ground or cultural knowledge, etc. (Polya 1954, 115f). The conclusion of
a plausible inference is always only provisional; its acceptability is closely
dependent on the particular circumstances given. Rescher maintains, too,
that it is definitely not universalizable formal considerations that deter-
mine the evaluation of the plausibility of conclusions, but rather, it is
clearly situation-specific, contextual factors in the widest sense (Rescher
1976, 111ff).
(vi) The plausibility of the premises and the emergence of contra-
dictions. It is one of the basic issues of plausibility theory that it can
treat both the emergence and the resolution of contradictions.
Firstly, those premises which we are compelled to treat as the start-
ing point of our reasoning are not to be regarded as certainly true, but
can only be assumed to be plausible in the given context, that is, they
are more credible than their potential alternatives if certain conditions
are satisfied. This, in accordance with the nature of the partial basis
mentioned in (iv), may result in the inconsistency of the basis which we
have to use as our background for reasoning. In this sense, the basis
is informationally overdetermined. We have to reason by making use of
not completely trustworthy information—that is, building on a partial
basis. We know that only plausible inferences can be drawn from a par-
tial basis, and these inferences can lead to contradictory conclusions in
certain cases: to explain one’s data, one may set up hypotheses which
mutually exclude each other but which are plausible in certain respects
in a given context (Rescher–Brandom 1979, 160). That is, the emergence
of contradictions may have its sources in plausible inferences.10
Secondly, resolving this kind of informational overdeterminacy is only
possible if we decide what to abandon amidst bits of information which
contradict each other. To achieve this, we need to exceed purely formal
considerations, as was argued for in point (v), and somehow have to com-
pare the possible alternative decisions. If we consider conclusions to be
tools in information processing (for more on this, cf. Rescher 1976, 97ff),
10 Of course, a partial basis does not necessarily lead to the emergence of contradic-
tions, but the emergence of contradictions is one possibility that may arise from
the peculiarities of the partial basis.
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plausible inferences can be perceived as converting a set of premises into
information of a certain plausibility, that is into a conclusion (cf. also
point (vi)). This provides an opportunity for us to compare the conclu-
sions that can be drawn from particular subsets of an informational set
and choose the one which appears to be the most probable, the most
optimal, and the most credible for us. One may use plausible inferences
once again to resolve the (possible) contradictions that emerge as the con-
clusions of plausible inferences drawn from the partial basis, examining
which is the most credible of the alternatives in a given context—hoping
that sooner or later an informational state is reached wherein novel con-
tradictions do not arise. That is: one of the possible means of resolving
contradictions is plausible inference.
To sum up: the simplest way to characterize the strong correlation
between plausible inferences and the emergence of contradictions is to
regard plausible inferences as one of the possible sources of the emergence
of contradictions on the one hand, and as one of the possible means to
resolve contradictions on the other.
(vii) The cyclic and prismatic nature of plausible reasoning. We
reason cyclically by starting off from an inconsistent set of premises. We
return to the problems in question again and again, and supplement-
ing the partial basis with different latent background assumptions we
transform the set of information at our disposal by drawing additional
plausible inferences, and re-evaluate the credibility of the respective data
(hypotheses, alternative explanations). During these cyclic returns we
aim to filter out hypotheses unacceptable for some reason gradually, ac-
cording to different — possibly contradictory — considerations (Rescher
1987, 304; 1976, 111ff, 118).11 This way it becomes possible to compare
one’s cycles and to assess one’s progress. First and foremost, there are
two questions one may consider during this process:
(a) The first question is whether one has managed to root out the
contradictions within a particular cycle (that is whether one has gained a
consistent set of information), or whether at least the plausibility of any
of the contradictory hypotheses has increased.
11 See Kertész–Rákosi (2005a;b) considerably more detailed characterizations of the
cyclic nature of argumentation in linguistics supported by a series of case studies.
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(b) The second question concerns the degree of plausibility of the
complete amount of information within a reasoning cycle as compared to
the total of other reasoning cycles.12
Moreover, the cyclic reasoning is at the same time prismatic as well.
The relation between the cyclic and the prismatic nature of reasoning is
formulated by Rescher clearly:
“[. . .] it may make perfectly good sense to proceed dialectically and consider
an issue prismatically, by proceeding in the variable light of not merely
different but even inconsistent perspectives.”
(Rescher 1987, 306f; emphasis added)
“[. . .] ‘dialectical’ reasoning is a matter of the repeated reconsideration of old
issues from newly attained points of view. The root idea of such reasoning
is that of a multistage process where we repeatedly re-examine one selfsame
issue from different and mutually inconsistent points of view. It is a matter
of developing a course of reasoning in several phases or ‘moments’ where we
consider an issue now from different and mutually incompatible points of
departure, moving in a round-about way from P via non-P to a conclusion
of some sort. We proceed in circles or cycles where we return to a certain issue
now in this light and now in that. We do not constantly press onwards to new
ground, repeatedly crisscrossing the same terrain, approaching the old issues
from different and often discordant angles. [. . .] In dialectical reasoning we
make assertions that are negated (‘corrected’ so to speak) by subsequent
counter-assertions. We have here a process of successive approximation as it
were, where at each stage we assert things that are literally false and in need
of eventual correction. When things go smoothly, however, these successive
corrections appertain to increasingly minor and insignificant respects. [. . .]
At each stage what we say is not literally correct but only correct up to a
point.” (op.cit., 303f; emphasis added)
(viii) The universality of plausible inferences. Although Polya dis-
cusses the mechanisms of plausible inference mainly in the domains of
12 This cyclic nature of reasoning has to be clearly distinguished from circularity:
“This circular process highlights the element of ‘self-correction’ present in sys-
tematic applications of plausibility analysis, allowing for a revised appraisal of
the initial data that provide the very materials of the analysis. There is a cyclic
movement, a closing of the cycle which requires a suitable meshing—a matching
process that eventually retrovalidates (i.e., retrospectively revalidates) the criteria
of plausibility assessment with reference to the results to which they lead. [. . .]
The sort of ‘self-criticism’ at issue does not reflect any vicious or vitiating circu-
larity, but in effect amounts simply to a feedback process that uses later, more
refined stages of the analysis to effect revisionary sophistications in the materials
from which earlier stages proceeded. One indeed returns to ‘the same point’ but
does so at a different cognitive level.” (Rescher 1976, 119; emphasis as in the
original and added)
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mathematics and the sciences, he also emphasizes that these mechanisms
are universal and not specific to these domains:
“The underlying principle is generally recognized in the natural sciences, and
it is implicitly admitted in the law courts, and in everyday life. The verifi-
cation of a consequence is regarded as reasonable evidence for a conjecture
in any domain. Thus our patterns appear as universal.
We pay, however, a price for such ‘universality’. Our pattern suc-
ceeds in being universal because it is one-sided, restricted to one aspect of
plausible inference. The universality becomes blurred when we raise the
question ‘What is the weight of such evidence?’ In order to judge the
weight of the evidence, you have to be familiar with the domain; in or-
der to judge the weight with assurance, you have to be an expert in the
domain. Yet you cannot be familiar with all domains, and you can still
less be an expert in all domains. And so everyone of us will notice soon
enough that there are practical limits to the universality of plausible infer-
ence.” (Polya 1954, 114; emphasis added)
One important consequence of this stance is that scientific and every-
day reasoning may rest on the same patterns of inference,13 although, of
course, from domain to domain these patterns may be manifested in very
different ways. Thus, at the outset nothing speaks against our assump-
tion that even the cognitive base of pragmatic principles may be governed
by plausible inferences rather than probabilistic associations in the sense
of Robinson. Before, however, elaborating on this, let us turn to an issue
which is of utmost importance. In particular, (S2′) cannot be maintained
if the patterns of plausible inference are considered to be merely abstract
constructs which are intended to model how people argue. Therefore,
in the next section we will show that the cognitive reality of plausible
inferences may be justifiedly hypothesized, although we know very little
about these cognitive processes and such a hypothesis is far from having
been proved convincingly.
2.2. On the cognitive reality of plausible reasoning
We do not claim that the mind is a plausibilistic system. However, we
assume two things. Firstly, that the cognitive mechanisms we try to cap-
ture ‘look like’ plausible inferences. Secondly, that the relations which we
13 Our hypotheses (S1′) and (S2′) are closely related, because we assume that both
scientific reasoning and everyday communicative behaviour make extensive use
of plausible inferences. See sections 4 and 5.
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interpret as plausible inferences may have some kind of cognitive reality,
although we do not know exactly what neural processes are at work.14
Let us, without striving for a comprehensive discussion of the literature,
mention two instructive examples illustrating the psychological aspects
of reasoning in general.
Dolinina (2001) examined the use of ‘theoretical’ (‘logical’, ‘formal’,
‘deductive’) and ‘empirical’ (‘pre-logical’, ‘traditional’, ‘inductive’) in-
ferences on the basis of neuropsychological evidence. She proposed the
following solution to what is called the problem of the heterogeneity of
thinking:
“[. . .] neurological experiments demonstrated that both mechanisms of rea-
soning are simultaneously present in the brain of one and the same per-
son, that both of them can be used, but that each of them is controlled
by a different hemisphere. [. . .] these results give a certain counterevi-
dence to Johnson-Laird’s claim that formal reasoning is not represented in
the mind. [. . .] In the case of reasoning patterns, the right hemisphere ap-
pears to control the quality of information (e.g., the truthfulness of premises,
testing them against the realities of the world and/or personal knowledge/
experience), whereas the left hemisphere is responsible for the correctness
of purely operational mechanisms (formal correctness of inferences). [. . .]
Since literate western-schooled individuals possess both modes of reasoning,
the question was raised [. . .], which of the modes is normally used [. . .]. Some
cognitive psychologists (e.g., Johnson-Laird and Moore) claim that the tra-
ditional, semantic way of reasoning is responsible for reasoning processes
and is represented in the mind, the formal being only a ‘performance’ strat-
egy. Others (Wilson and Sperber) stress the priority of formal reasoning.
Deglin’s neurological experiments on functional differentiation of right and
left hemispheres demonstrated that both strategies are present in the brain
[. . .], so an individual can choose whatever strategy is most appropriate to
the circumstances.” (Dolinina 2001, 130ff)
The neurological experiments carried out by Dolinina support the as-
sumption that there exist inferential patterns represented in the mind.
However, the evidence she refers to is not sufficient for giving a sophis-
ticated and convincing answer to the question of what kind of structure
14 This cautious claim of ours is analogous to Robinson’s evaluation of his own
approach: “The point [. . .] is not to say that the mind is a probabilistic system.
What it actually is, at yet another level of abstraction, is a bunch of interconnected
neurons reacting to the world. But the overall behaviour created by a neural
system situated in an environment looks like what we describe as probabilistic
behaviour. This behaviour, described best with a cognitive model such as the
one outlined above, can result in the kinds of behaviour described by linguistic
models of pragmatics at their level of description.” (Robinson 1997, 264; emphasis
added)
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these patterns of inference have and of what the application of particular
patterns normally depends on.
She hypothesizes that if one is able to judge the truth value of the
premises, then one prefers the ‘empirical’ mode, i.e., the use of the right
hemisphere of the brain, whereas with respect to domains one is not
familiar with, the ‘logical’ mode, i.e., the use of the left hemisphere is
preferred. That is, she assumes a model which isolates the use of infer-
ential patterns from the content of the premises.
However, in many cases where the ‘empirical’ mode was used, the
reasons given for the responses contained inferences as well, even if the
left hemisphere was suppressed or the experimentee had no formal edu-
cation. Then the task of the right hemisphere might be not to provide
the structure of inferences in general and the latter cannot be identical
with the rules of formal logic. Thus, the difference between the two ‘rea-
soning strategies’ seems to lie not in the use of reasoning patterns but
rather, in the consideration of the content of the premises. Accordingly,
the ‘theoretical reasoning mode’ can be characterized as the ability to
think hypothetically on the basis of formal rules of deductive logic.
The answers described by Dolinina as examples of the ‘empirical’ rea-
soning mode can be accounted for with the help of the theory of plausible
reasoning. Since, according to Polya (1954, 42ff), patterns of plausible
reasoning can be seen as tending to the corresponding pattern of demon-
strative inference when the credibility of the premises tends to certainty,
the mechanisms of plausible reasoning might explain the use of seemingly
deductive inferences by uneducated persons or by experimentees whose
left hemisphere was suppressed, too.
As a second example, we refer to research carried out by Politzer
and Bourmaud (2002) who describe experiments which tried to give an
answer to the question of what conclusions can be drawn if in infer-
ences of the type ‘modus ponens’ or ‘modus tollens’ the truth of the
‘if . . . then’ premise is uncertain or if there is at least another premise
which undermines the truth of the major premise. They observed that
the experimentees judged the uncertainty of inferences much higher with
respect to medical topics than, for example, topics concerning mechanics.
That is, Politzer and Bourmaud, too, consider the application of infer-
ences to be domain-dependent, but they characterize the sources of this
domain-dependence in a more sophisticated way than Dolinina does:
“The key factor seems to be the awareness that the level of understanding of
the causal link between antecedent and consequent of the conditional differs
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from one domain to another: for the participants, the link may be more or
less strong, allowing for more exceptions to the hypothesis if it is weaker.”
(Politzer – Bourmaud 2002, 347; emphasis added)
“[. . .] there is one single common mechanism, namely the recognition of
one or several factors that are necessary conditions for the consequent to
occur and, by this very fact, are conditions that implicitly complement the
antecedent of the conditional to make it an actual sufficient condition. The
degree of belief in the satisfaction of those factors acts as a mediator to define
the degree of sufficiency of the conditional premise, that is, its credibility,
and consequently, by inheritance, the degree of belief in the conclusion of the
argument. The truth status of the conclusion is treated by degree rather than
in all-or-nothing manner, and this degree is closely correlated to the degree
of belief in the premise.” (Politzer – Bourmaud 2002, 353; emphasis added)
As opposed to Dolinina’s hypothesis, Politzer and Bourmaud’s findings
speak for the cooperation of the formal aspect and the content. These
findings are in full accordance with Polya’s claim that the strength of the
conclusion is directly proportional to the strength of the premises and
that normally inferences rest on a partial basis (see 2.1 (iv), (v), and
Polya 1954, 41ff).
These two examples witness that, on the one hand, it is reasonable
to assume that plausible inferences are not merely abstract theoretical
constructs and that they have some kind of cognitive reality; nevertheless,
on the other hand, research in this field is still immature and we know
very little about the details of this cognitive reality.
In the next two sections we will illustrate how our model can capture
some of the issues raised in section 1.
3. On (S2′)
3.1. On the correlation between plausible inferences and the cognitive
basis of pragmatic principles
So as to show the capability of our approach to plausible reasoning to
capture the problem (P2), first we have to demonstrate that the main
tenets of this approach correlate with those aspects of the cognitive base
of pragmatic principles which Robinson points out.
As Robinson (1997, 262) maintains, one of the difficulties which one
encounters in trying to analyse an example like
(3) I am looking for a doctor.
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is that although it is assumed that the speaker means a medical doctor,
there is an infinite amount of background information that may specify
the meaning of doctor in different ways. For example, at a dissertation
defence party, probably a person with a PhD degree may be meant. Now,
objective theories in the sense of section 1.1 are expected to clarify the
way particular contexts cause particular interpretations, whereas this is,
as we have seen, not possible.
Robinson suggests a solution to the problem of accounting for the
infinity of the background information yielding the possible interpreta-
tions of (3) which centers on the idea of a distributed system that makes
use of probabilistically stored concepts grounded relative to the environ-
ment. He presumes that “related things are probabilistically associated
together in terms of, and reflecting the strength of, the frequency of their
associations in the world” (Robinson 1997, 262). Thus, concepts are as-
sumed “to generalize statistically towards a statistically defined centre,
or centres, at the same time that their associative nature automatically
results in context-sensitive activation” (op.cit., 263).
Alternatively, we assume that the interpretations of terms like doctor
in (3) emerge as the result of drawing plausible inferences from a partial
basis in the sense of (iv) in section 2.1. This means, firstly, that on the one
hand the infinity of the basis is acknowledged, on the other hand, however,
it is also acknowledged that the only part of this basis accessible to the
hearer, i.e., what he/she encounters is a partial basis. Whereas Robinson
assumes a probabilistic and non-inferential mechanism, we hypothesize
a plausibilistic and inferential one. Revealing the mechanisms according
to which plausible inferences are drawn from a partial basis is one of the
major achievements of plausibility theory.
The mechanism of drawing plausible inferences from a partial basis
is, as we emphasized in (v) in section 2.1, deeply context-dependent.
The fact that plausible inferences are context-dependent is important,
because context-dependence is one of the major features of the cognitive
basis of pragmatic principles:
“[. . .] there are an infinite number of possible contexts for each utterance,
so we are faced with the problem discussed earlier about objective systems,
needing to specify the full base of understanding of an utterance; everything
must be represented or derivable from a representation.”
(Robinson 1997, 262; emphasis added)
Therefore, in principle plausibility theory is capable of capturing this
aspect of the basis at the outset.
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Another relevant feature of plausible inferences is that they are closely
connected both to the emergence and the resolution of inconsistencies.
Since, as we have seen in (vi) in section 2.1, the conclusion of plausible
inferences is not true with certainty, but only more or less credible; new
information may turn up any time and can undermine our trust in the
conclusions, compelling us to reconsider the situation at issue and to re-
vise both the premises and the inferences from them. It is one of the most
attractive impacts of plausibility theory that it is capable of accounting
for these mechanisms (see Kertész 2004b, chapter 22; Kertész–Rákosi
2005a and Rákosi 2005 for detailed discussion). Now, the emergence of
inconsistencies is one important property of the cognitive basis of prag-
matic principles as well:
“If something in later discourse or activity should appear to contradict or
modify this specific understanding, then a modification of the active under-
standing is possible; one is only adding information and not contradicting a
previous assumption.” (Robinson 1997, 266; emphasis added)
Thus, we may maintain that in principle plausibility theory is appropri-
ate for analysing the emergence and resolution of contradictions in the
cognitive basis of pragmatic principles.
Finally, in section 1.3 we concluded among other things that it is not
unreasonable to assume that with respect to the phenomena Robinson’s
considerations focus on there is a kind of cyclic and prismatic inference
and decision process at work. In (vii) in section 2.1 we demonstrated
that it is precisely cyclic and prismatic procedures that are at the heart of
plausible inferences. Therefore, it is only natural that there may be a kind
of correspondence between the mechanisms governing plausible inferences
and the prismatic and cyclic relations between pieces of information that
constitute the cognitive basis of pragmatic principles.
After having pointed out the appropriateness of plausibility theory
for suggesting a possible solution to (P2), what remains to be shown is
how plausibility analysis works. So, the next section will be devoted to
the analysis of instructive examples.
3.2. Examples
3.2.1. First example
(4) John: Did you go to Bloomingdale’s when you went to New York?
Mary: Well, what do you think of my new dress? (cf. Robinson 1997, 257)
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Cycle 1. The information at John’s disposal is insufficient, because he
does not know whether Mary was at Bloomingdale’s or not. Therefore,
John tries to get rid of the informational underdetermination. On the
basis of his cultural knowledge he knows that Bloomingdale’s is a depart-
ment store in New York.
Nevertheless, there is a piece of information which indicates that the
answer might be yes: he understands that Mary was in New York where
this department store is situated. Thus, a necessary condition15 for the
affirmative answer is probably satisfied:
(5) 〈If Mary went to Bloomingdale’s, then she was in New York.〉16
It is possible that Mary was in New York.
After it has become more credible that Mary was in New York (since John under-
stood so and Mary did not protest against this presupposition of John’s question),
it is more credible that Mary was at Bloomingdale’s.
This inference is an instance of shaded reduction.17
Of course, this is only one of several possible arguments which John
uses to reach conclusions. As a first approximation, Mary’s answer leaves
the informational underdetermination of the partial basis untouched. It
facilitates drawing further inferences by providing John with a new piece
of information. That is, the partial basis which John’s inferences rest on
are supplemented by the new information that Mary has a new dress.
Cycle 2. John evaluates the situation from another perspective in that
he considers the information content of Mary’s answer. He attempts to
supplement the partial basis by further background information. At this
point associations may play a significant role; that is, he has to find
cultural knowledge which could be used in the situation at issue. For
example:
15 That Mary was in New York is a necessary condition for her having visited Bloom-
ingdale’s, because she could not have been in this department store if she had
not gone to New York.
16 In our analyses “〈. . . 〉” will indicate implicit premises.
17 For lack of space, we cannot introduce the patterns of plausible reasoning system-
atically and elucidate the patterns we will apply in the examples to follow. Let
it be sufficient to refer to Polya (1954); Kertész (2004b); Rákosi (2005). For the
reader’s convenience, however, in the appendix we enumerate the patterns which
we make use of in the analyses.
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(6) 〈It is possible that if Mary has a new dress, then she bought it.〉18
Mary has a new dress.
It is more credible that she bought it.
This inference is an instance of shaded modus ponens.
John’s cultural knowledge also includes the information that Bloom-
ingdale’s is a department store which sells dresses. This information gives
rise to an analogical inference yielding the conclusion that Mary could
buy a dress there, too:
(7) 〈It is possible that if Mary bought a new dress, then she did this at Blooming-
dale’s.〉
It is possible that she bought a new dress.
After it has become more credible that Mary bought a new dress (cf. the previous
inference), it is more credible that Mary did this at Bloomingdale’s.
This inference is an instance of shaded modus ponens.
Each of the above inferences rest on uncertain premises, therefore
they yield conclusions whose truth value is uncertain, too. As a result of
the peculiarities of the partial basis mentioned in section 2.1, this means
that new information may turn up which contradicts the conclusions
already drawn. However, at this point John does not possess information
of the latter kind.
However, it is not difficult to construct situations in which he does.
For example, the context-dependence of implicatures is indicated by the
fact that if John knows that Mary never buys dresses at Bloomingdale’s
because the only thing she buys there is caviar, then he will draw the
opposite conclusion. That is, in this case the last inference of cycle 2
will be as follows:
(8) 〈It is possible that if Mary visited Bloomingdale’s, then she did not buy a dress.〉
It is possible that Mary did not buy a dress.
After it has become less credible that Mary did not buy a dress, it is less credible
that Mary visited Bloomingdale’s.
This inference is an instance of shaded modus tollens.
At this point John’s knowledge includes an inconsistent set of as-
sumptions, because the result of cycle 1 contradicts the result of cycle 2.
18 Of course, we cannot exclude that she made the dress herself or that it was
presented to her by her husband. That is why it is only possible that she bought it.
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Cycle 3. So as to resolve the contradiction, John has to decide which
conclusion he thinks to be more plausible. Accordingly, he examines the
problem from another perspective:
(9) 〈It is possible that if Mary visited Bloomingdale’s, then she bought caviar.〉19
It is possible that Mary bought caviar.
After it has become less credible that Mary bought caviar (because she did not
mention it), it is less credible that Mary went to Bloomingdale’s.
(9) is an instance of shaded modus tollens.
The last conclusion would speak for the assumption that Mary did
not visit Bloomingdale’s. Nevertheless, it is also possible that John re-
considers a certain part of his background knowledge:
(10) 〈It is possible that if Mary bought a new dress, then she did this exceptionally
at Bloomingdale’s.〉
It is possible that Mary bought a new dress.
After it has become more credible that Mary bought a new dress, it is more
credible that she bought it exceptionally at Bloomingdale’s.
(10) is an instance of shaded modus ponens.
However, it is not at all certain that John can decide between the
above alternatives on the basis of the information at his disposal; it may
be the case that he will ask further questions.
Of course, (5)–(10) are only some of the possible reconstructions
of (4). Nevertheless, they have illustrated how implicatures can be ac-
counted for by plausibility analysis.
3.2.2. Second example
It is worth considering what happens when a third person, say Jim, who
does not know anything about department stores in New York, attends
the dialogue. Probably he will start his inferences by considering Mary’s
answer:
(11) 〈It is possible that if Mary has a new dress, then she bought it.〉
Mary has a new dress.
It is more credible that she bought it.
19 This premise is the result of an analogical inference.
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(11) is an instance of shaded modus ponens.
Then he tries to find a connection between New York and the pur-
chase of the new dress:
(12) 〈It is possible that if Mary bought a new dress, then she bought it in a department
store in New York.〉
It is possible that Mary bought a new dress.
After it has become more credible that she bought a new dress, it is more credible
that she bought it in a department store in New York.
(12) is an instance of shaded modus ponens.
(13) It is possible that Bloomingdale’s is in New York.20
It is possible that the department store in which Mary bought her new dress is
in New York.
It is possible that Mary bought her new dress at Bloomingdale’s.
(13) is an analogical inference.
The inferences which Jim carried out are even less certain than those
carried out by John, and accordingly, the plausibility of the conclusions
Jim has drawn are less plausible than those drawn by John.
3.2.3. Third example
The Gricean theory explains the following example by the violation of
the maxim of relevance:
(14) Peter: Mrs. Johnson is an old hag.
Rose: The weather was beautiful this summer, wasn’t it?
We will show that this phenomenon can be explained with the help of
our model in the following way.
Cycle 1. First of all, Peter tries to relate his own utterance and Rose’s
reply. However great his efforts are, he does not succeed in finding a chain
of inferences in which these two pieces of information work as premises.
Therefore, he notices that Rose’s reply is irrelevant.21
20 Jim can infer this information from the fact that it is presupposed by John’s
question. Cf. cycle 1 in 3.2.1.
21 Accordingly, here ‘relevance’ means that on the basis of the utterance and the
information given, one is able to construct a chain of inferences which rule out the
informational under- or overdeterminacy; otherwise the utterance is irrelevant.
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Cycle 2. It may be the case that Peter, due to this conclusion (and per-
haps due to the awkward silence accompanied by Rose’s unsympathetic
face), is so embarrassed that he puts up with not understanding Rose’s
reaction and with the fact that he got entangled in such an awkward
situation. However, if he has already been in a similar situation, then
he may draw an analogical inference which will yield the implicature of
Rose’s utterance:
(15) 〈When Betty answered Bruno in an irrelevant way, then Bruno’s utterance touched
on something unpleasant for the hearers who did not want to speak about this
topic.〉
Rose answered me in an irrelevant way.
It is possible that I said something which touched on something unpleasant for
the hearers.
(15) is an analogical inference.
It may also be the case that Peter realizes this conclusion by consid-
ering Rose’s gestures and the sudden awkward silence. This makes him
understand that irrelevance indicates the rejection of the topic:
(16) 〈When Betty’s answer was preceded by an awkward silence and other people also
looked disapprovingly at Bruno, then they did not want to speak about the topic
Bruno had just touched on.〉
Rose’s answer was preceded by an awkward silence and also others looked disap-
provingly at me.
It is possible that I said something which was embarrassing for the others and
they did not want to speak about the topic at issue.
(16) is an analogical inference.
(17) 〈It is possible that when Bruno said something which was embarrassing for the
others, and they did not want to speak about the topic at issue, then Betty
answered in an irrelevant way, because she wanted to make Bruno notice this.〉
It is possible that I said something which was embarrassing for the others, and
they did not want to speak about the topic at issue.
It is possible that Rose answered me in an irrelevant way because she wanted to
make me notice this.
(17) is an analogical inference.
The inferences also show that after the first cycle Peter changed the
perspective from which he evaluated the situation.
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3.2.4. Fourth example
Levinson (2000) discusses, among other things, basic properties of gen-
eralized implicatures. He, too—like Robinson—claims that formal logic
cannot serve as a tool for the reconstruction of implicatures. However,
unlike Robinson and in accordance with our hypothesis, he concludes
that implicatures can be explained by reconstructing them as the results
of plausible inferences:
“There is a [. . .] problem that has received less attention, what might be
called the logical problem of reconstructing speaker’s intentions [. . .]. Let
us (following Aristotle) assume that we reason from goals to actions utiliz-
ing a logic of action, or a practical reasoning. Now, some theorists have
assumed that intention-recognition is simply a matter of running that rea-
soning backwards [. . .]: we observe the behavior and figure out the underly-
ing intention by the same rules that we convert intentions into the actions
that will effectuate them. The logical problem is that this cannot work, for
the simple reason that for all inference systems one cannot work backwards
from a conclusion to the premises from which it was deduced— there is al-
ways an infinite set of premises which might yield the same conclusion [. . .].”
(Levinson 2000, 30; emphasis added)
“What [we] clearly need is a set of heuristics, mutually assumed by sender
and receiver, that can serve to multiply the coded information by a factor of,
say, three, by licensing inferential enrichment of what is actually encoded by
choice of a specific signal. These heuristics must at the same time constrain
that enrichment in such a way that the overall message can still be correctly
recovered, by guiding (or coordinating) the match between the chosen signal
and the recoverable, augmented message.” (op.cit., 30f; emphasis added)
According to Levinson, these heuristics rest on a special kind of plausible
reasoning, namely default logic:
“GCIs [generalized conversational implicatures] are inferences that appear to
go through in the absence of information to the contrary; but additional in-
formation to the contrary may be quite sufficient to cause them to evaporate.
Thus the mode of inference appears to have two important properties: it is
a default mode of reasoning, and it is defeasible. [. . .] A reasoning system is
said to be defeasible (or when instantiated in an argument nonmonotonic)
if an inference or argument in that system may be defeated by the addition
of further premises. [. . .] Default logics aim to capture a [. . .] mode of rea-
soning—namely, the notion of a reasonable presumption, a ceteris paribus
assumption.” (ibid., 42ff; emphasis as in the original)
Nevertheless, besides similarities, there are also crucial differences be-
tween our and Levinson’s approach. The aim of the following brief anal-
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ysis is only to illustrate the difference between our solution and Levin-
son’s; the scope of the present paper does not permit a more extensive
treatment of these differences.22 For example,
(18) At our university some professors go prepared to their lectures.
implicates that
(19) At our university not all professors go prepared to their lectures.
Cycle 1. The phrase some Xs are Ys means that there are Xs which
are Ys:
(20) There are professors at our university who go prepared to their lectures.
However, some Xs are Ys does not say anything about whether all Xs
are Ys; its information content leaves both possibilities open.
Cycle 2. If the hearer wants to do away with the informational under-
determination for some reason,23 he or she has to examine the situation
from another perspective. The following consideration presents itself im-
mediately:
22 It is interesting that the example we chose seems to refute Levinson’s claim that
default conclusions are cancelled if contradicting information is made available.
23 Experiments with children show that we need some reason to go beyond the literal
meaning of the utterances: “If preschoolers, unlike adults, cannot readily infer
the pragmatic nature of the task, and are not given adequate motivation to go
beyond the truth conditional content of the utterance, they may readily settle for
a statement which is true but does not satisfy the adult expectations of relevance
and informativeness.” (Papafragou – Musolino 2003, 269)
For adults the use of certain phrases, i.e., knowledge of language may fulfil this
task (for example some, start). But the presence of such phrases is not a necessary
condition for implicatures: “[. . .] scalar inferences can be induced by partial
contextual orderings, which may be supplied by stable world knowledge or created
in a completely ad hoc fashion [. . .]:
A: Did you get Paul Newman’s autograph?
B: I got Joanne Woodward’s.
→ B did not get Paul Newman’s autograph.” (Papafragou – Musolino 2003, 258)
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(21) 〈It is possible that if there were no professor who would go unprepared to his
lectures,24 then the speaker would have said that At our university all professors
go prepared to their lectures.〉
The speaker did not say that At our university all professors go prepared to their
lectures.
It is less credible that there is no professor who goes unprepared to his lectures
(i.e., it is more credible that there are professors who go unprepared to their
lectures).
This inference is an instance of shaded modus tollens.
Cycle 3. Our cultural knowledge also contains information which contra-
dicts this conclusion. Namely, one of the prototypical features of profes-
sors is that they go prepared to their lectures:
(22) Professors go prepared to their lectures.
The conclusion obtained within cycle 2 and (22) results in inconsistency
which has to be resolved by the hearer somehow.
Cycle 4. (22) is an element of the speaker’s cultural knowledge as well.25
Despite this, he or she has used some instead of all in (18). So, it is
possible that he or she does not agree with (22).
(23) 〈It is possible that if the speaker had agreed with the statement that At our
university all professors go prepared to their lectures, he or she would have uttered
this.〉
The speaker did not say that At our university all professors go prepared to their
lectures.
It is less credible that the speaker agrees with the statement.
(23) is an instance of shaded modus tollens.
This is an argument for the implicature mentioned in (19). The
hearer’s task, then, is to consider the strength of the arguments for and
against the implicature.
3.2.5. Summary
The analyses of the examples were intended to illustrate that it is possible
to explain different kinds of implicatures by making use of plausibility
24 I.e., if all professors go prepared to their lectures.
25 This is an analogical inference.
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analysis. The analyses have shown that implicatures can be assumed to
work along the same lines as plausible inferences do. That is, they are
characterized by
(a) drawing inferences from a partial basis,
(b) using different patterns of plausible inferences,
(c) the emergence and resolution of contradictions,
(d) context-dependency,
(e) the cyclic and prismatic revaluation of the information available.
4. On (S1′)
In section 1.1 we raised two closely related problems: a metascientific
and an objectscientific one. Up to this point we tried to solve the object-
scientific problem (P2) by the application of plausibility analysis. Never-
theless, the method of our scientific method, namely, plausibility analysis
is no less problematic than the nature of implicatures: our findings de-
pend on the effectivity of this method to a considerable extent. Therefore,
it is important to reflect on our own argumentation metascientifically so
as to clarify some of the methodological difficulties we encounter:
(a) Our own line of reasoning started from uncertain premises as well:
since we had no convincing evidence at our disposal, we assumed
only hypothetically that the inferences we discussed in the previous
section were or could have been carried out.
(b) This means that there was only a partial basis which our inferences
could rely on.
(c) Not only the persons in the above examples, but we, too, as re-
searchers had to struggle with the informational underdetermination
of the partial basis.
(d) The way we applied plausibility analysis is only one side of the prism
through which we observed the object of our investigations, namely,
the cognitive basis of pragmatic principles.
(e) Accordingly, we ourselves as analysts had to proceed cyclically and
prismatically by making use of the perspectives of cognitive psychol-
ogy and linguistics, and above all of our own cultural knowledge.
For example, as we have seen, particular aspects of the theory of
associations which Robinson argued for could be integrated with our
approach, although in a somewhat reinterpreted way: they may give
an answer to the question of how the premises which contribute to
filling the informational gap in the partial basis are selected.
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In what follows, we will make a few brief remarks on how this kind of
cyclic and prismatic reasoning works with respect to the construction of
pragmatic theories. Accordingly, we will motivate our hypothesis (S1′)
as a possible solution to (P1). However, we will not go into a detailed
discussion, because elsewhere we put forward possible applications of
plausibility analysis to theory construction in linguistics.26
As we saw in section 1.1, Robinson claims that we must depart from
a theory of cognition and proceed toward a descriptive theory of linguis-
tic behaviour. The solution proposed by Robinson to (P1) consists in
assuming a hierarchy of systems where every level is determined by a
lower level. These different, hierarchically related systems correspond to
different theories.27
Accordingly, in Robinson’s view, the relationship between the object-
and the meta-level is always unidirectional. However, we showed in sec-
tion 1.3 that this methodology inevitably runs into an infinite regress
which can be interrupted only by stopping at the level at which there
is no avoiding the identification of the structures of the theoretical de-
scription with structures of the mind. Moreover, we also saw that the re-
searcher uses his/her own cultural knowledge as a point of departure and
projects it onto a lower level system. Now, the question arises whether
our approach results in the same problems, namely, those summarized
in (P1)(a)–(d).
To begin with, let us mention that Hample (1985/1992)—in refer-
ring to O’Keefe (1977/1992)—differentiates between three perspectives
of investigating argumentation. Argument1 examines the products of
reasoning; it handles inferences as being static representations of reports
26 See Kertész (2004a;b); Kertész – Rákosi (2005a); Rákosi (2005).
27 “I have attempted to show how regularities in one theory may be emergent from
the behaviour of a lower-level system. [. . .] By relating this model to the regular-
ities described at a linguistic level of behaviour we do avoid the problems created
by directly instantiating these linguistic models as cognitive theories. But, be-
cause this model is also a description, we are left with the question of whether
or not we will run into the same problems as before, only at a different level
of description. Unfortunately, the answer here may well be yes. It is therefore
necessary to take the relationship between the two levels of modelling I have dis-
cussed one step further. [. . .] In this view, we must use our objective theories not
as ends in themselves but as methodological tools to point to regularities in one
system as emergent from another. [. . .] This means we will need multiple levels of
description capturing all of the situational, behavioural, and biological phenom-
ena that interact to create organized behaviour. None of these, in isolation, will
be an adequate model of cognition.” (Robinson 1997, 268f; emphasis added)
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on the results of drawing inferences. It suggests that the aim of argu-
mentation theory is the analysis of such reports. The paradigm example
of this view is formal logic.28 Seen from the point of view of argument2,
argumentation is a process which aims at influencing the hearer’s beliefs
or actions. In this respect, argumentation theory should focus on reveal-
ing the factors underlying argumentation as interaction. The third view,
i.e., argument0, centers on the mental processes governing the construc-
tion of arguments. It seeks to find out to what extent and in what way
mental processes are constitutive of the peculiarities of arguments. Thus,
assuming that argumentation in general and inferences in particular have
some kind of mental reality is one of the hypotheses widely discussed in
the contemporary literature of argumentation theory.
Hample introduces a further distinction, namely that between weak
and strong claims for argument0. The weak view focuses on argument1 or
argument2 and attributes less relevance to the cognitive aspects of argu-
mentation. It suggests a methodology which takes the opposite direction
to Robinson’s proposal: we should choose the investigation of argument1
or argument2 as our starting point and proceed towards argument0, be-
cause the structure of argument0 can be entirely reconstructed from the
investigation of argument1 or argument2. Thus, we can construct a theory
of argument0 if we proceed from the theory of argument1 or argument2
towards a theory of argument0. It is clear that this attitude is similar to
the point of view of the pragmatic theories mentioned in this paper.
Strong claims for argument0 (which, according to Hample, are rarely
encountered) take the opposite direction: they try to understand argu-
mentation by starting from the mental and proceeding towards its public
manifestations. Argumentation in this sense is not something special,
because it involves a wide variety of cognitive events such as perceiving,
remembering, associating, etc. (Hample 1985/1992, 99). This reminds
us of Robinson’s conception, according to which one may understand
argument0 only if one understands the whole of cognition.
28 “In the everyday sense of the word, inference is a thought process during which
from given knowledge we obtain new knowledge that has not been included ex-
plicitly [. . .] in the original knowledge. However, if inference is a mental activity,
and logic deals with inferences, then the latter still studies certain aspects of
thinking. We have no direct insight into thought processes, we can study only
their linguistic manifestations. [. . .] The task of logic can be only the study of
the relationship between the premises and the conclusion.” (Ruzsa 2000, 10; our
translation)
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Comparing our approach with these two views, it seems to be the case
that our proposal can be treated either as an instance of the weak view
according to which plausible inferences are objectifications of our own
cultural knowledge about patterns of public inferences; or, alternatively,
they are instances of the strong view, thus they can be interpreted as
constituting a new element in Robinson’s ‘distributed system’. However,
there may be a third and more convincing possibility as well:
“The weak view has a sterile conception of invention and seemingly little
room for creativity. [. . .] Its portrait of the arguing person seems deter-
ministic and only vaguely humane. [. . .] The strong view, on the other
hand, enmeshes argument0 so thoroughly in psychology that arguing men-
tally ends up having no special character at all. An individual scholar need
not maintain that one set of claims is superior to the other. One reasonable
tactic is to try to shade one set into the other, in an attempt to resolve the
tensions between them.” (Hample 1985/1992, 100f; emphasis added)
In fact, this strongly resembles that kind of cyclic and prismatic inference
procedures which we discussed in section 2.1 and applied in section 3.
These observations can be generalized in the following way. On the
one hand, the peculiarities of the linguistic level vastly underdetermine
the cognitive level, because there will always be a lot of incompatible
theories which claim to describe certain aspects of linguistic behaviour,
while we know too little about the way cognition works. On the other
hand, the cognitive level has to be considered fundamental. It is only
natural therefore that a cyclic way of proceeding is required in the course
of which we as researchers try to correlate the characteristics of the lin-
guistic and cognitive level again and again, from different perspectives,
looking for solutions which can resolve the inconsistencies between the
hypotheses drawn from them. Thus, our answer to the question asked at
the beginning of this section is clearly no.
Therefore, we are justified in interpreting the above quotation as
supporting our hypothesis according to which theory formation in prag-
matics proceeds along the same lines as plausible reasoning in general
and implicatures in particular. That is, reasoning in the field of prag-
matics can be characterized by the same properties we summarized with
respect to the cognitive basis of pragmatic principles which underlie im-
plicatures, namely,
(a) drawing inferences from a partial basis,
(b) using patterns of plausible inferences,
(c) the emergence and resolution of contradictions,
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(d) context-dependency,
(e) the continuous cyclic and prismatic revaluation of the information
available.
There are two ways to evaluate this finding from a metascientific point
of view. Firstly, the sub-problems of (P1) may turn out to be just mani-
festations of this kind of scientific reasoning—that is, (P1)(a)–(d) can be
interpreted in terms of cyclic and prismatic reflection on the object of in-
vestigation rather than as mistakes such as the category error mentioned,
the circularity of argumentation, interpretations with unexplicated crite-
ria, or the fact that researchers objectify their own cultural knowledge
as pragmatic principles. This kind of reinterpretation of the phenomena
which Robinson labelled as methodological mistakes clearly legitimizes
‘objective theories’. The point, then, is that theory formation in prag-
matics works in a very different way (i.e., along the principles of plausible
reasoning) from what is commonly assumed. Secondly, the application
of cyclic and prismatic reasoning in the course of the construction of
pragmatic theories may lead to the opposite result as well: namely, to
realizing that these problematic cases are really errors. But in certain
situations it is one of the primary functions of cyclic and prismatic re-
flection to rule out cases which are real mistakes and to distinguish them
from the continuous revaluation of our scientific knowledge base.
5. Conclusions
As we saw in section 2.1, plausible reasoning is universal in that it works
with respect to both everyday behaviour and scientific reasoning. Ac-
cordingly, it is the same principles which may be used to capture both
object-scientific problems such as, for example, the nature of implica-
tures, and metascientific problems such as the nature of scientific reason-
ing. Nevertheless, the universality of plausible reasoning is not unlimited
and must not mean uniformity. Rather, as the quotation in (viii) in
section 2.1 emphasizes, the way plausible reasoning is manifested differs
from domain to domain. Then, two crucial problems arise:
(a) How do the two cases of plausible reasoning we considered in
this paper — i.e., as a constitutive component of the cognitive base of
pragmatic principles and as a constitutive component of scientific rea-
soning — differ?
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(b) What is there in common between, on the one hand, drawing
plausible inferences in everyday discourse such as the reasoning under-
lying implicatures, and, on the other, drawing plausible inferences in
pragmatic theories whose task is to reveal these inferential mechanisms
in everyday communication?
It goes without saying that these questions have to be left open for
now and should be tackled by future considerations. Therefore, the line
of argumentation put forward in this paper seems to pave the way for
starting systematic investigations into the argumentational structure of
linguistic theories—this is a field of which very little is known and that
which is thought to be known, is probably easy to refute.
Appendix: Patterns of plausible
reasoning applied in section 3.229
Shaded reduction
It is possible that if A, then B.
It is possible that B.
After verifying B, A is more credible.
It is possible that if A, then B.
It is possible that B.
After B has become more credible, A is more credible.
Shaded modus tollens
It is possible that if A, then B.
It is possible that B.
After B has become less credible, A is less credible.
It is possible that if A, then B.
Not B.
A has become less credible.
29 Other versions of these schemes are possible as well, varying in the degree of the
plausibility of the different premises; cf. Polya (1954, 26); Rákosi (2005).
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Shaded modus ponens
It is possible that if A, then B.
It is possible that A.
After verifying A, B is more credible.
It is possible that if A, then B.
It is possible that A.
After A has become more credible, B is more credible.
Analogical inference
a1 has the properties S and T
a2 has the properties S and T
. . .
an has the properties S and T
an+1 has the property S
an+1 also has the property T
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